Two-thirds of climate-related trade agreements signed since the start of 2025 involve critical raw materials, with a surge in “critical mineral diplomacy” driven by the energy transition, the AI buildout and defence expansion, according to new analysis from the International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD). 

The latest update to IISD’s Trade & Climate Tracker, which maps out how recent trade and economic agreements address the green transition, identified 211 agreements signed between January 2025 and September 2026 that focused on areas like climate governance, energy and heavy industry decarbonisation.  

Of those, 139 were linked to critical raw materials, with a total of 79 countries and blocs signing such deals over 21 months. 

In the first quarter of 2026 alone, 41 agreements linked to critical raw materials were announced, nearly a threefold increase from the 15 recorded by the tracker in the same period last year.  

Demand for critical minerals “is rising on several fronts”, the institute said, including from the energy transition, AI and data centre expansion, and defence needs, while producers such as Indonesia, the DRC and Zimbabwe have restricted raw ore exports to push processing at home.

China’s dominance in refining and its limits on rare earth and magnet exports have also prompted buyers, including the EU, Australia, India and G7 members, to de-risk supply chains and prioritise critical raw materials cooperation as “a key part of trade diplomacy”, it noted. 

Some 95 of the 139 agreements (68%) were MoUs, cooperation frameworks, joint statements or similar instruments, rather than free trade agreements, reflecting “nations’ sense of urgency” as governments “bypass time-consuming and complex formal deals”, IISD said. 

Its tracker classifies agreements into two groups: critical raw materials-linked agreements, which include broad trade deals such as FTAs that cover several areas, and agreements mostly centred on critical minerals. 

Demand for critical minerals “is rising on several fronts”, the institute said, including from the energy transition, AI and data centre expansion, and defence needs, while producers such as Indonesia, the DRC and Zimbabwe have restricted raw ore exports to push processing at home.

China’s dominance in refining and its limits on rare earth and magnet exports have also prompted buyers, including the EU, Australia, India and G7 members, to de-risk supply chains and prioritise critical raw materials cooperation as “a key part of trade diplomacy”, it noted. 

Some 95 of the 139 agreements (68%) were MoUs, cooperation frameworks, joint statements or similar instruments, rather than free trade agreements, reflecting “nations’ sense of urgency” as governments “bypass time-consuming and complex formal deals”, IISD said. 

Its tracker classifies agreements into two groups: critical raw materials-linked agreements, which include broad trade deals such as FTAs that cover several areas, and agreements mostly centred on critical minerals. 

The US led by a wide margin, with 41 of its 48 mapped agreements either centred on critical materials or containing strong provisions in that area. India signed 15 critical raw materials-linked agreements, while China, Canada, Saudi Arabia and the EU signed 11 each. 

Meanwhile, 18 African countries were party to agreements linked to critical materials. The DRC had the most, with six agreements involving China, Rwanda, Tanzania, the UAE and the US. China signed deals with five African counterparts, while the UAE and the US each signed with three. Four agreements were between African countries. 

The research also showed a “significant number of cooperative commitments between resource-rich states collaborating with each other”.  

“Though critical minerals cooperation isn’t driven by climate goals alone, trade deals increasingly focus on access to these resources, the energy transition and security, and supply chain diversification, while producer countries are also using them to capture a fairer share of value at home,” said Alice Tipping, director of trade and sustainable development at IISD. 

Some 84 agreements included provisions on building value in mineral-producing countries, from local processing, exploration and skills training, compared with 94 that focused on securing mineral supply. 

The EU and the US used “different vehicles” to secure their critical minerals supplies, Pedro Espaillat, policy advisor at IISD, told GTR. The EU “more often commits to building value chains in producing countries, such as local processing, along with ESG standards”, while the US “leans more towards tools that secure supply for its own industries”, he said. 

The EU has recently been ramping up efforts to improve its own supply capabilities, with the European Commission announcing on November 4 it would create a European Corporation on Critical Raw Materials as part of its 2027 work programme. 

During a trade-focused event in Brussels on Wednesday, Luisa Santos, deputy director general of lobbying organisation BusinessEurope, said EU companies needed to diversify supply and invest in more local producing in mineral-rich nations.  

“We need new sources of imports,” she said. “We don’t want to depend always on big partners, some of them not reliable.” 

Myriam Ferran, deputy director general at the European Commission’s Directorate-General for International Partnerships, also argued the EU’s objective was to “develop part of the value chain beyond extraction” in raw materials-rich countries. 

She said the EU backed local refining and offtake agreements, adding that there was “an element of EU economic security” in the approach.

IISD’s tracker found that 61 of the 139 critical raw materials-linked agreements (44%) included at least one provision on finance, offtake or investment facilitation. Among the 60 centred agreements, the figure was 37 (62%). 

Most of these provisions concerned investment facilitation and finance, Espaillat said. Offtake appeared in only 15 agreements, 10 of them critical raw materials-centred. 

The tracker only records agreements, not outcomes, so it cannot confirm whether investment has since flowed, Espaillat noted.